Model
There are three candidates K = {1, 2, 3}. There is a finite set of I voters. Each voter i can submit a ballot, or vote vector, (c i (1), c i (2), c i (3)), where c i (k) denotes the score allocated by voter i to candidate k. The scoring rule defines the permitted ballots. As in Myerson (2002) , we consider (A, B)-scoring rules, that are defined by two parameters 0 ≤ A ≤ B ≤ 1. For a fixed (A, B)-scoring rule, each voter can submit either a permutation of (1, B, 0) or of (1, A, 0). Let C denote the space of all possible ballots. Given a profile of ballots (c 1 , . . . , c I ), the winner W (c 1 , . . . , c I ) of the election is the candidates whose total score I c i (k) is maximal. In the case of a tie, uniform randomization is used to select among the winners. pure common values. Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. The prior probability of state ω is P (ω). All voters share a common utility U (k|ω) for candidate k = 1, 2, 3 in state ω. We assume that there is a unique best candidate k ω that maximizes U (k|ω) for each state of the world.
The finite set S is a set of possible signals. The conditional probability of signal s ∈ S given ω is denoted F (s|ω). Given the state ω, each voter receives a conditionally independent signal following the distribution F (s|ω).
A strategy σ : S → C is a function assigning a vote vector to each signal. When σ i (s) is a degenerate lottery with probability one of c, we slightly abuse notation and write σ i (s) = c. A profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ I ) of strategies is symmetric if σ i = σ j for all i, j. When referring to symmetric strategy profiles, we drop the subscript. The common expected utility for the strategy profile
Consider a sequence of symmetric strategies (σ I ). We say that the probability of error goes to zero if, for every ω,
as I goes to infinity. The probability of error goes to zero if and only if the probability of the best candidate k ω winning the election goes to one for every state of the world.
A smaller and newer literature studies information aggregation for multiple candidates with common or interdependent values. A theme in these studies is that approval voting outperforms other institutions. However, this comparison is currently understood only for restricted classes of environments. Goertz and Maniquet (2009) consider a class of environments where voters are indifferent between the two inferior candidates. Within this class, approval voting is the only simple scoring rule that admits an informationally efficient limit equilibrium. 1 Bouton and Castanheira (2010) consider a class of environments where a majority of voters prefer two candidates to a third minority candidate, but have incomplete information about which of the two candidates is better.
Within this class, approval voting yields a unique limit equilibrium that efficiently aggregates information, while plurality rule can have multiple equilibria. Both papers work with Poisson population uncertainty, which allows for a cleaner construction of limit equilibrium.
Our analysis, which makes no assumptions either on the information or on the utility, applies to arbitrary environments. However, we do not attempt to explicitly construct limit equilibria.
Instead, we argue indirectly by adapting an insight due to McLennan (1998) : in a common value election, any strategy that maximizes utility is an equilibrium. While our hypotheses are more general than those in the literature, our conclusions are also less sharp. We cannot speak to the 1 A scoring rule is simple if B = 0. For example, negative voting is not a simple scoring rule.
uniqueness of equilibrium nor to its characterization.
Results
Our first result asserts that the maximal equilibrium utility under approval voting is greater than or equal to the maximal equilibrium utility under approval voting or under negative voting. Proposition 1. If σ * is a symmetric equilibrium for plurality rule or for negative voting, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium ρ * such that U (ρ * ) ≥ U (σ * ).
Proof. First take the case where σ * is a symmetric equilibrium of plurality rule. Then define the strategy profile ρ for approval voting by ρ(s) = σ * (s). 2 Then the expected utility of ρ is identical to the expected utility of σ * . Since U is continuous and the space of symmetric strategies is compact, there exists a symmetric strategy profile ρ * that maximizes the common expected utility U for approval voting among all symmetric strategy profiles. By Theorem 2 of McLennan (1998), ρ * is an equilibrium for approval voting. By its construction,
The argument for σ * as a symmetric equilibrium of negative voting is identical.
While the reasoning for Proposition 1 is mathematically straightforward, to our knowledge it has not been previously observed. Specifically, any ballot that can be submitted under plurality rule can also be submitted under approval voting. So the expected utility under plurality rule can be replicated under approval voting, by having each voter approve the singleton set corresponding to the candidate that she would support under plurality rule. Of course, approval voting also allows other ballots that support two candidates. However, the observation of McLennan (1998) is that the best equilibrium in a game of common values must be as good as any strategy profile. So the best equilibrium under approval voting must be at least as efficient as any equilibrium under plurality rule. The argument makes transparent the connection between approval voting and plurality rule: the fundamental reason that approval voting outperforms plurality rule (or negative voting) is that approval voting allows a larger set of feasible ballots. While similar arguments for approval voting are suggested in private value environments, its flexibility has direct force in common value environments.
Our second finding is that the best asymptotic equilibrium under approval voting is at least as good as the best asymptotic equilibrium under any interior (A, B)-scoring rule where 0 < A ≤ B < 1. Unlike plurality rule or negative voting, the strategies under general (A, B)-scoring rules cannot be exactly replicated by approval voting. When A = B, a general (A, B)-scoring rule allows for twelve distinct vote vectors, while approval voting allows only for six. However, the outcome of the (A, B)-scoring rule can be approximated through appropriate randomization of the ballots under approval voting. Specifically, the expected vote counts can be maintained under approval voting.
This approximation becomes asymptotically precise, so the limit outcome under a general scoring rule can be replicated by approval voting.
2 To be pedantic, we identify σ * (s) within the strictly large strategy simplex for approval voting.
Proposition 2. Suppose A, B ∈ (0, 1). If there exists a sequence (σ I ) of symmetric strategies for the (A, B) scoring rule that takes the error probability to zero, then there exists a sequence (ρ * I ) of symmetric equilibria for approval voting that takes the error probability to zero.
Proof. For any symmetric strategy profile σ of the (A, B) scoring rule, define the symmetric strategy profile ρ of approval voting with permutations of the following:
Without loss of generality, fix a state ω such that k ω = 1. We now prove that the limit probability that candidate 1 wins the election goes to one, conditional on the state ω. All probabilities and expectations hereon are conditional on ω. Define the random variable
where the "·" operation denotes the dot product. The random variable δ Ii is the difference in the scores given to candidate 1 and candidate 2 by voter i when playing the strategy σ I in the (A, B)-scoring rule. Similarly, let
i.e. the difference in the scores of candidate 1 and candidate 2 when playing the strategy ρ I under approval voting.
We first show that the expectation of the scores differences are identical under σ and ρ.
Proof. We will show that the expectations conditional on a fixed signal are equal: E(δ Ii |s i = s) = E(∆ Ii |s i = s) for all signals s i . Then the unconditional expectations are also equal.
First, computing the expectation for the (A, B)-scoring rule:
Next, using the construction of ρ I in (1) and (2) for approval voting:
The right hand sides are equal to each other.
Consider the case where lim V(δ Ii ) → 0 for sufficiently large I. Then δ Ii converges to a point mass on some constant E for large I. However, because (A, B) are interior, 0 is not part of the support of δ Ii because it is impossible for a ballot to provide equal scores to candidates 1 and 2.
Therefore, since the probability that Ii δ Ii > 0 goes to one, it must be the case that the point mass is located at a strictly positive point. This point defines the expectation lim E(δ Ii ) = E > 0 for large enough I. By Lemma 1, it is also the case that lim E(∆ Ii ) = E > 0 for large enough I.
By the weak law of large numbers for triangular arrays, the probability that
∆ Ii /I > 0 goes to one. Hence the probability I i=1 ∆ Ii > 0 also goes to one. So, without loss of generality, suppose lim V(δ Ii ) > 0 for all I, i. First, note that:
By the Central Limit Theorem for triangular arrays:
δ Ii ≤ 0 must go to zero by the assumed efficiency of σ I , the triangle inequality
must go to zero. Hence:
The second factor goes to infinity, so does the product:
→ 0. Applying the Central Limit Theorem for triangular arrays and the triangle inequality as before, we have that Pr I i=1 ∆ Ii ≤ 0 goes to zero. Since the probability that Pr I i=1 ∆ Ii ≤ 0 goes to zero, the probability that the total score for candidate 1 is strictly larger than the total score for candidate 2 must go to one. Similarly, the probability that the total score for candidate 1 is strictly larger than the total score for candidate 3 also goes to one. The intersection event is that candidate 1 wins the election, and the probability of this event goes to one.
By Theorem 2 of McLennan (1998) , there must exist a sequence of symmetric equilibrium ρ * Ii that provides weakly more common utility than ρ Ii for each fixed population I. But since ρ Ii takes the probability of error to zero, then ρ * Ii must also take the probability of error to zero.
